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BEGINNINGLESS PAST, ENDLESS FUTURE,  
AND THE ACTUAL INFINITE
Wes Morriston
One of the principal lines of argument deployed by the friends of the kalām 
cosmological argument against the possibility of a beginningless series of 
events is a quite general argument against the possibility of an actual infinite. 
The principal thesis of the present paper is that if this argument worked as 
advertised, parallel considerations would force us to conclude, not merely 
that a series of discrete, successive events must have a first member, but also 
that such a series must have a final member. Anyone who thinks that an end-
less series of events is possible must therefore reject this popular line of argu-
ment against the possibility of an actual infinite.
Advocates of the kalām cosmological argument claim that a series of 
events in time must have a beginning. Putting the matter a bit more pre-
cisely, they claim that a series of discrete, successive events must—as 
a matter of metaphysical necessity—have a first member. On the other 
hand, they have no problem at all with the suggestion that a series of 
events in time might have no final member—that it might never come to 
an end. Why the difference? The received explanation is that a beginning-
less series of discrete and successive events would be an actual infinite, 
whereas an endless one would be a merely potential infinite. The actual 
infinite is said to have absurd implications that do not afflict a merely 
potential infinite.
In the present paper, I reject this explanation. I claim that if the main 
line of argument deployed by the friends of the kalām cosmological argu-
ment against the possibility of an actual infinite worked as advertised, 
it could be employed with equal effect to show that an endless series of 
events is also metaphysically impossible. Since (as almost all would agree) 
an endless series of discrete events is not metaphysically impossible, it fol-
lows that something must be wrong with this entire line of argument.
I shall begin by briefly reminding the reader of how the general argu-
ment against the possibility of an actual infinite goes. I will then exhibit 
the implications of this argument for the possibility of an endless series of 
discrete and successive events. The heart of the paper will be concerned 
with William Lane Craig’s claims (i) that an endless series of events is a 
merely potential infinite, and (ii) that this establishes a relevant distinction 
between the beginningless past (which is supposedly impossible) and an 
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endless future (which is clearly possible). I will argue that no relevant dis-
tinction has been established, and that Craig’s approach to this issue must 
be abandoned.
What’s Wrong with the Actual Infinite?
To show that an actual infinite is impossible in the real world, Craig ap-
peals to intuitions that he expects most people to share. One of his favor-
ite examples is that of Hilbert’s Hotel. The (in)famous hotel has infinitely 
many rooms, each of which accommodates exactly one guest. Each is oc-
cupied, and the hotel is “full.” Nevertheless, by moving the occupants 
around in just the right way, new guests can be accommodated—indeed, 
infinitely many new guests can check into the hotel without making any 
of the original guests leave the hotel.1
Craig also stresses the point that inverse arithmetical operations yield 
inconsistent results for cardinal infinities. This too can be illustrated by 
a thought experiment involving Hilbert’s Hotel. Suppose that infinitely 
many guests check out. Depending on which ones leave, the hotel may 
be left with either a finite number, or with an infinite number, of guests. 
Mathematicians deal with this problem by leaving subtraction for cardinal 
infinities undefined. “In the real world,” however, Craig insists that guests 
could leave a hotel, no matter what its size. So if Hilbert’s Hotel actually 
existed, we would be stuck with these inconsistent results.
Craig blames all these allegedly absurd implications entirely on the 
fact that Hilbert’s Hotel is infinite. From this he thinks it follows that an 
actually infinite collection is metaphysically impossible. But consider the 
following objection. Even if one grants that a Hilbert’s Hotel is metaphysi-
cally impossible, it does not immediately follow that an infinite number of 
things cannot exist. The allegedly absurd implications of a Hilbert’s Ho-
tel—for example, that infinitely many additional guests could be accom-
modated by creatively moving its guests around—follow only because in-
finity is combined with another salient feature of the hotel—viz., the fact 
that its guests can be moved. But when we return to the case we are primar-
ily interested in here—that of a beginningless series of events—there is a 
relevant disanalogy. Past events cannot be “moved out of” their respective 
temporal locations. How, then, are we supposed to derive absurd implica-
tions from an infinite (because beginningless) series of past events parallel 
to those that can be exhibited in an infinite hotel accommodating infinitely 
many movable guests?
Here is Craig’s answer:
Your objection to the Hilbert’s Hotel illustration is that the alleged absurdity 
arises only from the fact that the guests can be moved about, whereas events 
1Just in case anyone needs reminding, one might make room for one new guest by mov-
ing each of the current guests to the room with her old number plus one; and one might 
make room for infinitely many new guests by having each guest move to the room with 
double her old room number. 
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in time cannot. Isn’t it enough that we can mentally move the guests about? 
Suppose their rooms had no doors.2
Craig’s point appears to be that even if the guests couldn’t “really” be 
moved about, we could still do the thought experiments required to show 
that an actual infinite is absurd. We could still conceive of all the present 
guests occupying the even-numbered rooms (instead of their present ones), 
and of infinitely many additional guests occupying all the odd-numbered 
rooms. We could also conceive of alternative scenarios that would repro-
duce the worry about inverse arithmetical operations. Even with no doors, 
the absurdity of a Hilbert’s Hotel would still be quite apparent.
Initially, it may not be easy to see how this constitutes much of a re-
sponse to the objection. Doors can be created. So the guests can still be 
moved, and not only “mentally.” It is metaphysically possible for the 
guests to be moved. It is not metaphysically possible for events to change 
their temporal locations. So the disanalogy between a Hilbert’s Hotel and 
a beginningless series of events remains in full force.
However, I think that this quick and easy reply may underestimate 
Craig’s response. His real point must surely be that the actual movability 
of the guests is not essential to the absurdity of a Hilbert’s Hotel. Even if 
(per impossibile) we could conjure up a scenario in which it is metaphysi-
cally impossible for the guests to be moved, the absurdity of a Hilbert’s 
Hotel would still be obvious. Why so? Because infinitely many additional 
guests could have been accommodated (one guest per room) in a hotel with 
exactly the same rooms. It might seem that this lesson could be generalized 
to a beginningless past. Let me explain how.
Even though it’s now impossible for past events to be moved out of their 
temporal locations, we can conceive of alternative arrangements. Some 
of the events could have been left out, and they could have been differently 
distributed in time.3 And this, Craig may think, has implications that are 
every bit as absurd as those of Hilbert’s Hotel.
2Quoted (with permission) from correspondence. This point is further elaborated in a 
podcast on Craig’s “Reasonable Faith” website, in which he answers questions about a public 
discussion of the kalām cosmological argument that took place at Westminster College in 
Fulton, Missouri on March 16, 2009. In that discussion, I had made the point that past events 
are fixed in their temporal positions. After briefly summarizing my position, Craig says that 
he replied as follows.
This is just a thought experiment. Let’s suppose Hilbert’s Hotel is a hotel where . . . 
all the rooms are locked, so that people can’t move out of them, or maybe there are 
no doors to the rooms so that you have an infinite number of rooms, one person in 
each room, but there [are] no doors. . . . You can still imagine what it would be like for 
a person in room one to be in room two, the person in room two . . . can be in room 
four, and you can generate the same absurdities. You don’t have to go to the trouble 
of moving the persons physically.
Since I was there, I can attest that this is the exact line Craig took in our discussion! His 
podcast can be accessed at: http://www.rfmedia.org/RF_audio_video/RF_podcast/Debate-
on-the-Kalam-Argument.mp3. 
3One reviewer for Faith and Philosophy raised the reasonable question whether this is 
metaphysically possible. I take no stand on this issue here, but (as the same referee helpfully 
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To get this idea clearly before our minds, let’s conceive of a beginning-
less series of discrete, successive events of equal duration, terminating in 
a present event. We can represent such a series this way.
( . . . en, . . . e5, e4, e3, e2, e1, e0 ]
With this simple picture in mind, Craig’s worry about the beginningless 
series of past events may be understood as follows. We can conceive of an 
alternative possible world in which the same events (or at least events just 
like them) occurred in the same temporal order, but in which between each 
pair of events in the series as we originally envisaged it another distinct 
event has occurred. We can represent the alternative series in the follow-
ing way.
( . . . en, En,  . . .  e5, E5, e4, E4, e3, E3, e2, E2, e1, E1, e0 ]
In this scenario, infinitely many “additional” non-overlapping events 
(all the E’s) would have taken place within the same (infinite) amount of 
time. This can’t happen now, of course. But things could have been that way, 
and this—I believe Craig would say—is just as absurd as actually making 
room for new guests in a Hilbert’s Hotel without kicking anyone out.
We can reproduce the “subtraction” worry in the following way. All 
events prior to e3 could have been “left out” in such a way that e3 is the very 
first event in the series. Thus:
[ e3, e2, e1, e0 ]
In this case, infinitely many events would have been “left out” and only 
four would have occurred. Alternatively, every other event could have 
been “left out.” We can represent this possibility as follows.
( . . . en, . . . e4, e2, e0 ]
In this case, infinitely many events would have been “left out,” but infi-
nitely many would still have occurred.
Thought experiments such as these might seem to do the same work for 
Craig that his observations about a Hilbert’s Hotel do for an actually infi-
nite set of coexistent items. If we allow for the possibility of a beginning-
less series of events, then it appears that infinitely many more events could 
have occurred in the same amount of time. It also appears that infinitely 
many could have been left out with a finite remainder, but that infinitely 
many could also have been left out with an infinite remainder. These impli-
cations are said to be patently absurd, and we are invited to conclude that 
a beginningless past is just as impossible as a Hilbert’s Hotel.
pointed out) it makes no difference to the main argument of this paper. If the alternative 
series of events envisaged here is metaphysically impossible, then Craig is left without a 
response to my objection that a Hilbert’s Hotel is not suitably analogous to a beginningless 
series of past events.
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It is controversial, of course, whether there is genuine absurdity in ei-
ther case.4 But what if these implications of a beginningless series of past 
events were genuinely absurd—what if they really did show it to be meta-
physically impossible? Then, I claim, parallel reflections on an endless series of 
future events should yield precisely the same conclusion. They should convince 
us that it too is metaphysically impossible. But they don’t; so something 
must have gone badly wrong.
What about an Endless Series of Future Events?
Let’s begin by doing a simple thought experiment that will make the par-
allel between a beginningless series of past events and an endless series of 
future ones stand out clearly. Imagine two scenarios. In the first, we’ll sup-
pose that two angels—Gabriel and Uriel—have been taking turns praising 
God for one celestial minute each throughout a beginningless past. In the 
second, Gabriel and Uriel will soon begin taking turns praising God for 
one celestial minute each, and will do so forever. According to the friends 
of the kalām argument, the former scenario is metaphysically impossible 
because it involves an actual infinite, whereas the latter involves only a 
potential infinite and is not metaphysically impossible.
This won’t do. We can easily tweak the example in such a way as to 
make the endless series of future praises similar in all relevant respects to 
a beginningless series of praises. Suppose that God has just decreed that 
Gabriel and Uriel will take turns praising Him for one minute of celestial 
time, and that they will do so forever. Gabriel will do the odd-numbered 
praises and Uriel the even-numbered ones. Let’s go a step further. So as 
not to leave any opportunity for Gabriel or Uriel to mess things up, let’s 
suppose that this is no mere instruction or recommendation, but that God 
has exercised His supreme power in such a way as to make it the case that 
each praise in the endless series of praises we have envisaged will occur. 
Each of them is discrete, wholly determinate, and certain to occur because 
God has determined that it will occur.
It’s true, of course, that Gabriel and Uriel will never complete the series 
of praises. They will never arrive at a time at which they have said all of 
them. Indeed, they will never arrive at a time at which they have said 
infinitely many praises. At every stage in the future series of events as I 
am imagining it, they will have said only finitely many. But that makes not 
a particle of difference to the point I am about to make. If you ask, “How many 
distinct praises will be said?” the only sensible answer is, infinitely many.
It is worth underscoring this point, since Craig sometimes accuses his 
opponents of confusedly talking about a time at which infinitely many 
events will have occurred, and then (quite rightly) points out that no such 
time will ever arrive. So let me be perfectly clear. When I ask, How many 
4I myself am inclined to side with those who say that the properties of the infinite are 
simply different from those of the finite, and that it is a mistake to assume that what’s true of 
a finite collection must be true of any collection.
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praises will be said?, I am not asking, How many will have occurred when all the 
praises have been said? The answer to the two questions must be the same 
if, as would be the case for any finite series of praises, the series will be 
completed. But in the case of an endless (never-to-be-completed) series, 
the answers must be different. Each of infinitely many distinct praises will 
be said, precisely because there will be no future time at which all have 
been said.
Now, then, imagine someone, under the spell of Craig’s reflections 
on Hilbert’s Hotel, who offers the following objections to my imaginary 
scenario.
• If your scenario were possible, God could instead have determined 
that Gabriel and Uriel will wait a celestial minute after each pair of 
praises, thus making “room” for infinitely many more praises by a 
third angel—Raphael, say. Infinitely many praises by Raphael are 
“added,” and the praises of all three angelic beings will be said in the 
same (infinite) amount of time. That’s absurd.
• If your scenario were possible, God could instead have determined 
that Gabriel and Uriel will stop after praise number four. Infinitely 
many praises would be prevented, and the number of their future 
praises would be only four. Alternatively, God could have deter-
mined that Gabriel be silent during all the celestial minutes between 
Uriel’s future praises. In this case too, infinitely many praises would 
be prevented, but the number of future praises would instead be 
infinite. That shows that your infinite future praise scenario has in-
consistent implications.
Must we conclude from reflections such as these that an endless series 
of future events is metaphysically impossible? That even God could not 
bring it about that infinitely many distinct praises will be said, one after 
the other? Surely not! But then neither (say I) should we say that a begin-
ningless series of past events is metaphysically impossible. (At least not on 
these grounds.) As far as the alleged “absurdities” of infinite collections are 
concerned, the two cases are on exactly the same footing. The only differ-
ence is that at any time in an endless future each of infinitely many events 
will occur, whereas at any time in a beginningless past, each of infinitely 
many have occurred. The former is obviously possible. Why not the latter? 
What difference could a mere change of tense make?
A Merely Potential Infinite?
As noted above, Craig and other advocates of the kalām cosmological ar-
gument invariably reply: “But you are envisaging a merely potential infi-
nite here! We have claimed only that an actual infinite is impossible.”
Let’s think a bit about this response. How, exactly, are we supposed to 
distinguish between a true actual infinite and a mere potential one? Here 
is how Craig explains the difference:
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An actual infinite is a collection of definite and discrete members whose 
number is greater than any natural number. By contrast, a potential infinite is 
a collection that is increasing toward infinity as a limit but never gets there.5
Given this pair of definitions, is it clear that the endless series of future 
praises envisaged above is a potential, rather than an actual, infinite? I 
don’t think so, but in order to get completely clear about the issue we’re 
going to have to think a bit about the nature of time.
Note first how matters would stand on an “eternalist” view of time. Ac-
cording to the eternalist, time is analogous to a series of spatial locations, 
with each event “tenselessly” occurring at its position in a temporally 
ordered series. Future events are those that occur later than whichever 
time we take as our reference point (for example, the time at which I am 
typing these words), and past events are those that occur earlier than this 
reference point. On this view, there is no relevant difference between past 
and future. The praises occurring later than our point of reference on the 
time line are just as “definite and discrete” as those that occur earlier, and 
there is no more reason to think that there must be a first praise than to 
think that there must be a final one. In either case, we would have a clear 
example of an actual infinite. So given eternalism, there is no relevant dif-
ference between the Gabriel/Uriel scenario with no beginning, and the one 
with no end.
As far as I know, no advocate of the kalām argument is an eternalist. 
Certainly Craig is not. He holds that there is an ever-changing fact of the 
matter about what is happening, what has happened, and what will hap-
pen. Does this make a difference here? Given the reality of temporal be-
coming, should we say that the endless series of events that I have envis-
aged is a merely potential infinite?
Applying Craig’s definition of the potential infinite, let’s ask first 
whether the series is “growing toward a limit.” The answer must be no. 
As I have envisaged it, the series of future praises is not “growing” at 
all. As each praise becomes present, it is removed from the “collection” of 
those that are yet to come. The collection of future praises is, so to speak, 
losing members.6
So what, if anything, is increasing here? The answer must go something 
like this. Suppose Gabriel and Uriel have just begun their praises. As new 
praises become present and then past, they are continually added to the 
collection of those that have been said. This collection—the collection of 
praises that have been said, and not the collection of praises yet to be 
5William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd edition (Wheaton, 
IL: Crossway Books, 2008), p. 116. 
6By speaking in this way, I do not mean to imply anything about the ontological status of 
future events. In particular, I do not mean to suggest that they are somehow “there” in the 
future, waiting for their turn to become present. I could have said much the same thing in a 
more cumbersome way. For example, I could have said that the collection of future tensed 
truths about the praisings of Gabriel and Uriel is losing members. I’ll have a bit more to say 
about this in the next section.
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said—is the one that is continually growing, and it will continue to grow 
forever. Is it, to use Craig’s expression, “increasing toward a limit?” I’m 
not sure how the word “limit” is being used here. Certainly, the number of 
praises that have been said is not getting closer and closer to infinity! But 
perhaps all Craig really means to say is that the series of events that have 
occurred grows without limit.
If that’s all there is to a “potential infinite,” then perhaps we should 
say that at any of its stages the series is potentially infinite. Unfortunately, 
it’s not clear that the series of praises yet to be said by Gabriel and Uriel 
should not be characterized as an actual infinite.
Let’s begin by recalling Craig’s definition of the actual infinite.
An actual infinite is a collection of definite and discrete members whose 
number is greater than any natural number.
As I have imagined the scenario, each of the praises is definite and dis-
crete. What is their number? Since there is a first praise, the number of 
praises that have been said will always be finite. But that’s not what I’m 
asking about. What I am asking is this: How many “definite and discrete” 
praises will be said after a given moment of time? (It’s very important to 
keep our tenses straight here!) I do not see how the friends of the kalām 
argument can avoid the conclusion that the number of praises, each of 
which will be said, is (and always will be!) be greater than any natural 
number. No matter which praise you pick, it’s already a settled fact that 
Gabriel and Uriel will say one more each.
The opening words of the final verse of the much loved hymn, “Amaz-
ing Grace,” pretty well captures the situation I am imagining. “When 
we’ve been there ten thousand years, bright shining as the sun, we’ve no 
less days to sing God’s praise than when we first begun.” So how many 
days of praise is that? The only possible answer would seem to be, infinite-
ly many. Craig, however, denies that this is so, insisting that the number of 
future praises is merely “indefinite.”7
I do not see how “indefinitely many” could be the correct answer to 
the question I am asking. In the scenario as I have described it, nothing 
has been left indefinite. God has determined that each member of the end-
less series of praises will occur. For any n, praise number n will be said. 
There is a completely determinate fact of the matter about when it will be 
said, by whom, with what words, and in what precise manner. Nothing 
has been left “indefinite” or “indeterminate.” The correct answer to the 
question, How many praises will be said?, can only be, infinitely many. Given 
Craig’s own definition of the actual infinite, the series of future praises is 
an actual infinite.
If you are inclined to doubt that I am right about this, consider the fol-
lowing question. Why should we think that if there had been a beginningless 
7William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, Theism and Big Bang Cosmology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 25. This was also the line Craig took in the public discussion of the 
kalām cosmological argument at Westminster College referenced in note 2.
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series of events then there would have been infinitely many of them? The 
answer is obvious. Before any event in the imagined series had occurred, 
another had already occurred. Change the tenses, and a parallel argument 
applies to the endless series of future events in my thought experiment. No 
matter how many have been said, one more will be said. As noted above, it 
does not follow that there will be a time at which infinitely many have been 
said. But it does follow that right now infinitely many will be said.
I can think of only one way to make sense of the idea that the number of 
discrete events that will occur is “indefinite.” That would be to insist there 
is no fact of the matter about whether each of those events will be followed 
by another. If that were so, it might be completely up for grabs whether 
the series will come to an end. (There might be probabilities, of course, 
but no truth of the matter.) As I have envisaged the future series of praises 
by Gabriel and Uriel, however, it is not up for grabs whether the series 
will come to an end. God has already exercised His power in such a way 
as to guarantee that each of those events will occur, and will be followed 
by another. They are discrete and definite and completely determinate. If 
God is omniscient, He must know each of them in exhaustive detail. Their 
number can only be infinite.8
“Presentism” to the Rescue?
Craig also sometimes invokes his “presentist” view of time to try to avoid 
this conclusion.9 Presentism, as Craig defines it, is the view that “the only 
temporal items that exist are those that exist presently.”10 As a presentist, 
therefore, Craig holds that future objects and events don’t exist. Could this 
provide a suitable reason for thinking that the endless series of praises 
envisaged above could not be a true actual infinite?
If you are inclined to think that the non-existence of future events re-
quired by presentism makes any real difference here, then I invite you to 
do the following thought experiment. Suppose that God determines that 
Gabriel and Uriel will do just five pairs of praises. On this supposition, 
each of ten praises will be said. Are you barred from giving this obviously 
correct answer by the fact that those praises don’t (yet) exist? Must you say 
that the number of future praises is “indefinite?” No? Then why should 
this answer be any more acceptable when we return to our original sup-
position that God has determined that Gabriel and Uriel will take turns 
doing celestial minutes of praise without ceasing?
8Sometimes Craig insists that God’s knowledge is not propositional, and that we mustn’t sup-
pose that there are infinitely many thoughts in God’s mind. But the reference to God’s knowl-
edge of the future is not essential to my argument. My point concerns the number of objects that 
are in principle knowable—not the way in which an omniscient God would know them.
9He introduced this idea in the Westminster College discussion referenced above, and he 
discusses it further in the podcast cited in note 2.
10William Lane Craig, “In Defense of Presentism,” Time, Tense, and Reference (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 391. I think Craig’s reason for limiting the claim to “temporal items” 
is that he wants to leave room for the possibility of an atemporal Creator who enters time 
when He creates the universe.
448 Faith and Philosophy
Note also that presentism is a double-edged sword, since it implies that 
past objects and events don’t exist. If the non-existence of future events 
made any real difference to the question we are concerned with, you’d 
think the non-existence of past events would make the same difference. If 
the non-existence of future events entailed that an endless series is not an 
actual infinite, the non-existence of past events should have precisely the 
same unwelcome implication.
So how does Craig distinguish the two? I know of only one place 
where Craig answers this obvious question. There he says that because 
“past events, as determinate parts of reality, are definite and distinct 
and can be numbered, they can be conceptually collected into a total-
ity.” Consequently, “all the absurdities attending the real existence of an 
actual infinite apply to it.” The set of events after any event that has hap-
pened is, by contrast, “an indefinite collection of events, always finite and 
always increasing.”11
In the same passage, Craig criticizes Aristotle and Aquinas for having 
argued that the past is a merely potential infinite on the ground that “the 
series of past events does not exist in actuality.” They were mistaken, Craig 
says, because past events have a feature “not shared with future events, 
namely their actuality.”
This is puzzling, to say the least. For one thing, the claim that past 
events are “determinate parts of reality” appears to be incompatible with 
the presentist claim that past events do not exist.12 But even if the alleged 
asymmetry between past and future were allowed to stand (as it would on 
a “growing block” view of temporal becoming), it is hard to see why there 
must be anything “indefinite” about the number of events that occur after 
a given event. In the Gabriel/Uriel scenario, all indefiniteness is removed 
by an exercise of divine power. It would be very surprising indeed to learn 
that Craig or any other advocate of the kalām argument thinks it meta-
physically impossible for God to exercise His power in the required way.
Presentists like Craig may, if they like, say that only present objects and 
events exist. But they still have to acknowledge that there are truths about 
both past and future objects and events. What, if anything, makes them 
true? What is there, on the presentist view, for past- and future-tensed 
propositions to correspond to? Here is Craig’s answer:
What such an account of the truth of past- and future-tense propositions 
requires is that there are tensed facts corresponding to tensed proposi-
tions, and the A-theorist is only too eager to affirm this conclusion. Thus, 
the proposition that Plato wrote The Republic is true, on a view of truth as 
correspondence, because this event did occur; that is, a man named Plato 
did exist and wrote the work entitled The Republic. These are tensed facts 
that (depending on what one takes a fact to be) exist or obtain or are true 
11 Craig and Smith, Theism and Big Bang Cosmology, p. 25. My italics. 
12I am not sure whether Craig would have described himself a presentist when he gave 
this explanation.
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now, but were not so in, say 5000 B.C. So a view of truth as correspondence 
requires the objective reality of tensed facts, facts about what was or will be 
the case.13
Applying this idea to my Gabriel/Uriel scenarios, we can infer that the 
truth-makers for the propositions figuring in my stories will amount to 
no more than past- and future-tensed “praise facts” about Gabriel and 
Uriel that “exist or obtain or are true now.” We can then ask how many 
such future-tensed praise facts there are. Once again, the only reasonable 
answer is, infinitely many.
Occasionally, Craig seems to entertain the possibility that there need be 
no truth-makers at all.14 Would this help his case? I can’t see how. Even if 
there are no truth-makers, there must still be infinitely many truths about 
the future: for example, the truth that Gabriel will say praise number one, 
the truth that Uriel will say praise number two, and so on. In each case, 
that’s how it will be.
Working out the details of a presentist account of time and truth is not 
for the faint-hearted, and presentists like Craig have a lot of work to do. 
But as far as the argument of this paper is concerned, it doesn’t matter how 
they fill in the details. If there are truths about the future, then presentists 
cannot dodge questions about the number of events that will occur in sce-
narios like the ones I have proposed. If there is—now—a complete body 
of truth about an endless series of discrete and successive events, each of 
which will occur, presentists cannot avoid answering the question, How 
many will occur?15
I think it is fair to conclude that the appeal to presentism merely com-
plicates matters without blunting the main thrust of my argument. The 
non-existence of past events does not prevent us from asking how many 
have occurred. Nor should the non-existence of future events prevent us 
from asking how many will occur. In neither case will “indefinitely many” 
do as an answer.
Returning one last time to my fanciful illustration, each future praise by 
(or future-tensed praise fact about) Gabriel and Uriel is discrete and defi-
nite. Since their number is greater than any natural number, it follows—by 
the letter of Craig’s own definition—that such an endless series of praises 
(or praise facts) is an actual infinite.
I suppose Craig might add some clause to his definition of an “actual 
infinite” to avoid this implication—requiring, perhaps, that the members 
of the collection be concrete rather than abstract. But in the present context 
13Craig, “In Defense of Presentism,” p. 397.
14William Lane Craig, “Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the Grounding Objec-
tion,” Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001), pp. 337–352. 
15In this paper, I have argued for the possibility of an actually infinite series of future 
events. God could make the future both endless and wholly determinate. But given Craig’s 
long-standing commitment to the view that there is a complete and fully determinate body 
of truth about the future (all of it known to God), together with his belief in the life everlast-
ing, this must be more than a possibility for Craig. It must be the literal truth.
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this is a matter of no consequence. Whether we do or don’t call the series 
of future praises an “actual infinite” is not what matters. What does matter 
is that we can derive the same sorts of allegedly absurd implications that 
Craig and other friends of the kalām argument claim to be able to derive 
from a beginningless series of events.16 In this respect, an endless series 
and a beginningless series are in exactly the same boat. In my humble 
opinion, the proper conclusion is that these implications cannot be as ab-
surd as the advocates of the kalām argument make them out to be.17
University of Colorado at Boulder
16Craig has, of course, given other arguments against the possibility of a beginningless 
series of past events. Elsewhere I have dealt with his claim that no beginningless series of 
events could be formed by successive addition, as well as with his animadversions on the 
strange case of “Tristram Shandy.” See, for example, “Must the Past Have a Beginning?” Philo 
2.1, pp. 5–19. In the present paper, my aim has been only to show that the supposedly absurd 
implications of a Hilbert’s Hotel are no more telling against a beginningless series of discrete 
past events than they are against an endless series of discrete future ones. For most advocates 
of the kalām argument, this is a matter of some interest and importance.
17I wish to thank Brad Monton and Tyler Hildebrand for discussions that helped me for-
mulate the views expressed in this paper. I would also like to thank the Editor of this Journal 
and two anonymous referees for many helpful suggestions.
